Public Signaling in Bayesian Ad Auctions
Francesco Bacchiocchi; Matteo Castiglioni; Alberto Marchesi; Giulia Romano; Nicola Gatti · 2022 · arXiv
WASTE classifies this as Negative / Null Result Report · AI classification, approximate
The study found no significant effect — useful as a negative control or null benchmark for your own design.
Abstract (excerpt)
We study signaling in Bayesian ad auctions, in which bidders' valuations depend on a random, unknown state of nature. The auction mechanism has complete knowledge of the actual state of nature, and it can send signals to bidders so as to disclose information about the state and increase revenue. For instance, a state may collectively encode some features of the user that are known to the mechanism only, since the latter has access to data sources unaccessible to the bidders. We study the problem of computing how the mechanism should send signals to bidders in order to maximize revenue. While t
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Metadata source: arXiv